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1. a federal financial official should never talk about the stock market in public for three reasons:
     first, there is no way to know for certain when a market is overvalued or unervalued;
     second, you can't fight market forces, so talking about it won't do any good;
     third, anything you say is likely to backfire and hurt your credibility. People will realize you do not know any more than anybody else.
2. How do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions, as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and proce stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate, or become conplacent about, the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy.
3. Venice, I realized, is the antithesis of creative destruction,.It exists to conserve and appreciate a past, not create a future. But that, I realized, is exactly the point. The city caters to a deep human need for stability and permanence as well as beauty and romance, Venice's popularity represents one pole of a conflict in human nature: the struggle between the desire to increase material well-being and the desire to ward off change and its attendant stress.
     America's material standard of living continues to improve, yet the dynamism of that same economy puts hundreds of thousands of people per week involuntarily out of work. It's no surprise that demands for protection against the forces of market competition are on the rise--as well as nostalgia for a slower and simpler time. Nothing is more stressful for people than the perennial gale of creative destruction. Silicon Valley is without question an exciting place to work, but its allure as a honeymoon  destination has, I would guess, thus far gone largely unrecognized.

1. for its part, the Federal Reserve, in the interest of economic stability, had long sought to foster highly liquid debt markets through the use of what we called constructive ambiguity. The idea was that markets uncertain as to the direction of interest rates would create a desired large buffer of both bids and offers.
2. The economy was in a growth phase, but we wanted the inevitable downturn, when it came, to be less of a roller-coaster ride-a moderate slowing instead of a sickening plunge into recession,
3. Knowing when to start tightening, and by how much, and most important, when to stop was a fascination and sometimes nerve-racking intellectual challenge, especially because no one had tried it this way before. It didn't feel like"oh, let's execute a soft landing"; it felt more like"let's jump out of this sixty-story building and try to land on our feet."